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BASIS OF APPEAI LATE JURISDICTION 
This is a appeal from the Memorandum Decision, handed down 
from the Third Judical District Court, Honorable Scott Daniels, 
and is a final Judgment to dismiss said complaint April 29, 1983 
and jurisdiction is conferred though Title ?8-2a-3, Utah Code of 
Law, as a means to ascertain the correctness of the Memorandum 
Dec i si on, 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal bv Plaintiff from the "Memorandum 
Decision" in which the Trail Court granted "Good Faith" to the 
Idaho Decree, and a judgment of $150.C»0 in favor of Defendant, 
and against Plaintiff, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Whether or not a fair application of existing Utah 
law, to the facts of this case required a dismissal of the case, 
and the granting of "Good Faith" to the Idaho Decree, when the 
face of the Idaho Decree pointed to the fact that both parties 
were in fact Utah Citizens, and that the Defendant-Respondant 
left the matrimonial domicile in Utah, and went to Idaho for the 
sole purpose of securing a divorce by fraud on the court. 
B, Whether or not the "Memorandum Decision" upholds the 
Plaint iff-Appeallants' rights and protection that is granted to 
him, though the Utah Constitution, from unlawful!/ prosecution, 
and if it is lawfully for a Utah Citizen to file suit against 
another Utah Citizen in any foreign smypathic forum, rather than 
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the proper forum» as is the case here, 
C. Whether or not a fair application of existing Utah law 
to the facts of this case required a dismissal of the case, 
without giving the Plaint iff-Appeallant the RIGHT OF DISCOVERY, 
ar\d then to base the reason for dismissal of said case, on 
",,,Mo compelling evidence in this case.,.", March 18, I9SS this 
decision was made two davs after the serving oi "Plaintiffs' 
First Request for the production of documents", March 16, 1933, 
on the Defendant, nine days after the Defendants' appearance* 
D. Wheter or not Peter W, Guyon is in fact the Attorney 
for the Defendant-Respondant or if he is in fact representing a 
unknown third party, due to his confessed lack of knowledge of 
the whereabouts of the Defendant, March 19, 1988, and the Court 
Order, Februarv 12, 1988. finding the Defendant had ran away and 
disappeared, and now the Defendant in and though h#r Idaho 
Attorney, filing suit against the Plaintiff suing for issues 
that Peter W, Guyon has been fighting agaisnt in Utah, 
E. Whether or not Peter W. Guyon could even represent the 
Defendant-Respondant, bei ng the PIai nt i ff-Appea11 ants' fami 1y 
attorney, and at this moment is the representing the Plaintiffs' 
father in Court, and as the family attorney, he has access to 
psychological reports, homestudies, and other sensitive 
information acquired on the Plaintiff while a minor child, 
giving him a clear psvcholoqical edge over the 
PIai n i ff-Appeal 1 ant , 
F. Whether or not a -fair hearing was given to the 
Plaint if f -Appeal lant, due to the misrepresentations of Peter W. 
Guyon, attorney of the Defendanat-Respondant to the Trail Court, 
these misrepresentation 'were listed in the "Memorandum of 
Plaintiff ir\ opposition to Defendants' Motion for sanctions 
under Rule 11", April 13, 1988, that over twenty days has lasped 
and no refutation or evidence to the contrary has been made by 
Peter W. Gu-'on, these misrepresentation has been to such a 
magnitude so 9ts to confuse and pollute this case. 
G, Whether the Trail Court accurately upheld existing 
Utah Law, as to the denial of four counts of Rule 11 sanctions, 
against the Defendant-Respondant for submitting motions, in 
which each issue was already before ethe court, the court never-
said that these motions contained "good faith argruements" or 
"were warranted by existing law", but yet denied Rule 11 
sanctions, when each motion was not warrented. 
H, Whether or not the Trail Court upheld Utah Law, in the 
granting of sanctions in favor of Defendant-Respondant, against 
the PIaintiff-Appeal 1 ant, and did not base theses sanctions on 
any Rule(s) or Law(s), but on the vague argument, the 
Plaintiffs* lack of familarity of the Rules of Civil Procedures, 
or could these sanctions be a punishment against the 
PIaintiff-Appeal 1 ant for being poor, and representing himself 
PRO SE, dening him Equal Treatment and Protection under the law. 
I, Whether or not the PIaintiff-Appeal 1 ant was subjected 
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to slander actionable per se, by the Trail Court, after the 
Trail Court granted sanctions against the Plaintiff-Appeallant, 
the Plaintiff asked if he be allowed to make payments to the 
Defendant, submitting a "Affidavit of Imperious Litigant", to 
which the Courts* offical response was: 
"...Plaintiff apparently believes that because he is 
impecumious the Defendant should be made to bear the cost of his 
decision to proceed in PROPRIA PERSONA..." Memorandum Decision 
April 29, 1983 Honorable Scott Daniels 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
"Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the 
public acts, records, and judical proceedings of every other-
state. And congress may be general laws prescribe the manner in 
which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and 
the effects thereof," Federal Constitution; "rtice 4:1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Both parties were residents of Salt Lake County, Utah were 
on the 24th da/ of April, 1986 thev entered into matrimony in 
pursuant thereof they maintained a matrimonial domicile on 15? 
West 200 North *» 206, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That on the 14th day of August 1986, the Defendant went to 
the town of Ontario, Oregan to visit her brother, a Peter Russel 
Baker, who resided in such town. The Plaintiff came up on the 
30th of August, 1936 to pick up and return with the Defendant 
from her visit. Whereupon the 1st day of September the 
Defendant wanted to stay two more weeks with her brother, in 
Ontario, Oregan, due to marital problems he was going though. On 
the 13th dav of September^ 1986 the Defendants' mother had 
called a^ d said the Defendant had overdosed and was nut of 
control. The Plaintiff went to Ontario, (Vegan, whereupon he 
was informed that the Defendant had ran away to Parma, Idaho, 
there she disappeared, per se with a truck driver, The 
Plaintiff wont to Parma, Idaho where upon the morning of the 14th 
the Plaintiff cauierred with the Chief of Police of Parma, 
Idaho, and who verified the disappearance, whereupon the 
Plaintiff offjcally filed a "Missing Person" upon the Defendant. 
That on or about that da/, the Defendant called Mrs. Gunderson, 
the mother of a friend, and convaved that the marriage was over, 
and she was seeking a divorce. 
That one dav later, September 15, 1986 the Plaintiff called 
the Defendants' counsellor, a Dr. John Barber D.D, and relaid 
that the Defendant was oka/ and had went to Pamona, California, 
that she was unset at the overdose, and wanted to start over 
with \)er life. That she wasn't sure if she would let dworce, 
and wanted some time to think. 
That eiqht days later, on September ?9, 1996 the Defendant 
by and though a Idaho Attorney, R. Brad Massingill filed a 
Comolsmt for Divorce, claiminq to meet the Tdahos' requirement 
of Si' Weeks to acquire a domicile in said state. 
That the offically final Decree of the Court i»i Idaho was 
never sent to the Plaintiff. Mow the Defendant has given raise 
to the issue of oaternit^, claiming that there was a issue of 
the marriage, a minor child, Charity Angel Baker. 
That after the filing of the Divorce action, U e Defendant 
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returned to Pamona, California, where she was undergoing 
psychological treatment. Upon completion of said treatment, 
October 22, 1986 the Defendant returned again to this state, 
until November 5, 1936, five davs before the Default Hearing 
were she made a personal appearance before the Idaho Court, 
Since that time the Defendant has maintain a residence in 
hidinq from the Plaintiff, where she kidnapped and held said 
mi nor ch iId. 
Upon December 6, 1987, the Plaintif* found where the 
Defendant was residing a.nd filed on December 16, 1987 suit for 
Divorce, and served upon the Defendant the same, where she 
and said minor child promptly disappeared. 
Futherrnore the Idaho Magistrate issuing said Decree has 
been brought before the Idaho Judical Review because the face of 
the Idaho Decree finds that the Defendant left the Plaintiff on 
September 1, 1986, served the Plaintiff at the domicil in Utah, 
and the Complaint was filed on September 29, 1986 showing that 
the Defendant did not acquire a domicil in Idaho, but was a Utah 
Citizen, an4 acquired said decree by fraud upon the court. The 
Idaho Magistrate in the Divorce Proceedings was brought before 
Review for numerous violations of law. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 16, 1988, the complaint was filed by the 
Plaintiff appearing Pro Se. 
On January 11, 1989 complaint was served upon the Defendant, 
whereupon the Officer of Washington County, Idaho certified that 
the Defendant was living at Route 2, Box 145, Weiser, Idaho, in 
said county. 
On January 18, 1983, the Plaintiff filed MOTION FOR 
JURISDICTION and serving the same upon the Defendant at said 
address, the certified letter was returned by the U.S. Postal 
Service arsd marked "ADDRESSES UNKNOWN". 
On February 3, 1998, In conferance with the Honorable Scott 
Daniels concerning the disappearance of the Defendant and said 
Motion for Jurisdiction, where he ruled that service upon the 
D^fendant was not made, since the Defendant only recieved twenty 
days not the required thirty days on a out of state summons. 
Upon looking at the MOTION the Court asked about the alleged 
Idaho Decree, whereupon the Plaintiff submitted a copy of the 
same, Honorable Scott Daniels read though the same, and inquired 
what was the purpose of this complaint. The Plaintiff replied 
to obtain a valid decree of divorce, to which the Honorable 
Scott Daniels agreed that said Idaho Decree was not war-renting 
good faith, and wasn't valid. 
On February 5, 1988, the Plaintiff filed MOTION FOR SERVICE 
BY LETTER. 
On February 12, 1988, the Motion for service was heard and 
so Ordered. Whereupon the same day the Plaintiff served upon the 
Defendant the ADMENDED SUMMONS. 
On February 16, 1988, the Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR 
ANNULMENT OF IDAHOS' DECREE, MOTION FOR BLOOD TEST, MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD, Febraury 16, 1988 due to the 
Deiendants' disappearance. 
On March 7, 1988, Mr, Peter W. Guyon, made a official 
APPEARANCE FOR THE DEFENDANT, and a MOTION TO DISMISS, and 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER, to which on the same day the Plaintiff filed a MOTION 
FOR THE DISMISSAL OF PETER W. GUYON, based on him being the 
family attorney for the Plaintiff, and this being a direct 
conflict of interest. 
On March 16, 1998 the PI ai nt i f f .f i 1 ed a RESONSE TO MOTION 
TO DISMISS, RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, and futher filed 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 
On March 13^ 1988, all six motions, CBme before the court, 
wherein the Court took under advisment the dismissal of Peter W. 
Guyon, *r\d then proceed to dismiss the case, based on the 
invalid Idaho Decree. 
Upon the submitting of the purposed Order, the Plaintiff 
objected to it being signed, due to counsel misrepresenting that 
the Court had dismiss said action base on the "Good Faith 
Clause"- when neither party or the Court had not heard any 
comment about such a clause, and said comment was added after 
the fact. 
On March 21, 1983, the Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR REVIEW 
due to the courts about face concerning the validity o-f the 
Idaho Decree when no new evidence was submitt to show the 
Defendant had acquire a domicil in Idaho, and the only change 
in said case was the appearance of counsel -for the Defendant. 
On March 293 1^83 the Defendants' Counsel filed a MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, whereupon March 31, 1988 the 
Plaintiff filed RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
On April 1, 1988 the Plaintiffs' MOTION FOR REVIEW came 
legally and lawfully before the Court, whereupon the Court took 
said motion under advisement, and request from Plaintiff all 
documents sent to Idaho, and request a Memorandum from 
Defendant. Whereupon the Defendants' counsel illegally arid 
without ar\%> notice, whatsoever brought forth his MOTION TO 
DISMISS AMD ATTORNEY FEES, whereupon without an/ o^al argument 
the Court granted said attorneys' fees against the Plaintiff. 
On April 4, 1^88, the Plainriff submitted to the Court and 
counsel the requested documents, AFFIDAVIT OF IMPERIOUS LITIGANT, 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD TROY WIEDEUSCH <STAKER), and letter asking 
about misrepresent ions' Defendants' counsel made to the court. 
On April 5, 1988, the Defendants' counsel submitted a 
purposed Order, granting him a extra week uponwith to respond, 
a.f)d set a date upon which sanctions should be paid. The Plaintiff 
objected being the Court specifically Order Counsel to only 
prepare Order concerning sanctions of $150.00 against the 
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Plaintiff. 
On April 11, 1988, Defendants' counsel -filed the MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REVIEW, and MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11, concerning the Plaintiff allc-gation of 
misrepresentation to the court. 
On April 13, 1988 the Plaintiff filed a MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTION UNDER RULE 11, 
wherein he claimed the Defense of Truth, and outlined said 
misrepresentat ions. 
On April 18, 1988 the Defendants' counsel filed MOTION FOR 
CONTEMPT OF COURT AMD ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
On April 20, 1988, Plaintiff filed MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
On April 21, 1983 Defendants' counsel filed MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER, requesting protection from Discovery. 
On April 25, t983 Plaintiff filed a MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, in which the Plaintiff counter-
petitioned the Court for two counts of Contempt. 
On April 29, 1988 the Honorable Scott Daniels handed down 
his MEMORANDUM DECISION, in which he upholds his decision to 
dismiss said action. 
On May 5, 1988 the Plaintiff filed a MOTION FOR STAY UPON 
Appeal. 
On May 9, 1988 the Defendants' Counsel filed a OBJECTIONS 
AND MOTION FOR ADDITION ATTORNEYS' FEES, MOTION AND ORDER FOR 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS, in which the Defendants' counsel 
requested the seizure and freezing of the Plaintiffs' assets, 
father Counsel ORDERING this motion unlawfully into Court on May 
13, 1^88, not giving a five day notice as required by law. 
Or. May 11, 1988, the Plaintiff submitted a MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION AND ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING. 
On May 13, 1988 the Plaintiffs' MOTION FOR STAY UPON APPEAL, 
and Defendants' MOTION AND ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
came before the Court with the Plaintiff filing a REBUTAL TO 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR ADDITION ATTORNEYS' FEE, 
whereupon the default of the Defendant the Court dismiss MOTION 
AMD ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS and granted a STAY UPON 
APPEAL, upon posting of a SUPERSEDEAS BOND, and a NOTICE OF 
APPEAL, which was done forwith, 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The Disposition of the Trial Court, was to dismiss said 
Complaint for the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
on March 18, 1988. Futher upholding this decision, and adding 
the "Good Faith Clause" of the U.S. Constitution in the Trail 
Courts' MEMORANDUM DECISION, April 29, 1988. 
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE A 
1. The Defendant on April 24, 1986 upon their marriage 
licenses, where she described herself as being a resident of the 
State of Utah, and futhermore had legally acquired a domicil in 
this state, and was a bona fide citizen thereof. Marriage 
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License, Salt Lake Countv, Utah, April 24, 1986. 
2. That on November 10, 1988 in a Court of Law, and 
under oath, the Defendant described herself that as of September 
1, 1996 a bona fide citizen of Utah, whereas on that date she 
had left her husband and lived apart from hirn. Paragraph 3, 
Idaho Decree of Divorce, November 10, 1986 
3. That the Plaintiff presented under oath, that on 
September 21, 1986 the Defendant was found residing in Pamona, 
California where she was undergoing psychological treatment. No 
evidence has been shown to the contrary. Affidavit of Ronald 
Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), March 16, 1988. 
4. That the Plaintiff presented under oath, that on 
September 13, 1986 the Defendant in the State of Idaho was a 
"MISSING PERSON", Affidavit of Ronald Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), 
March 16, 1*83. 
5. That on September 29, 1986, a R. Brad ^assingill on 
behalf of the Defendant, submitts a Complaint for Divorce, in 
the foreign state of Idaho, in which it is alleged that the 
Defendant has resided in Idaho for the Six Week period to 
acquire a domicil in that state. Idaho Complaint for Divorce, 
Allegation # 1, September 29, 1986. 
6. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under 
oath, that on October 22, 1986, the Defendant again returned to 
this state. No evidence to the contrary has been submitted. 
Affidavit of Ronald Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), March 16, 1938. 
7. That on November 5, 1986 the Defendant called both the 
Plaintiff and his father, in which conversation she described 
herself as on the road for the last two months with a truck 
driver, and was coming down from a drug trip, and Yad went to 
Idaho- That no evidence to the contrary has been submitted, 
Affidavit of Ronald Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), March 16, 1983. 
8. That the Default Hearing was held in the foreign state 
of Idaho, in which the foreign forum issued said decree, in 
which the Mr, Wiedbusch <c<taker) failed to answer or otherwise 
appear, Idaho Decree oi Divorce, November 10, 1986. 
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE B 
1. That the Plaintiff presented to the court, and under 
certification thereof, that the Defendant was not a "Pona FideM 
resident of the foreign forum, atid had used FRAUD thereupon to 
proof to the foreign forum that she had meet the requirement to 
acquire a dmucil therein, namely a SIX UEEK RESIDENCE. No 
evidence to the contrary has been submitted. Motion for 
annullment of Idahos' decree, February 16, 1^88, 
2. That the Defendant by and though the Idaho Decree has 
twice tried to prosecute the Plaintiff on felony charges of 
non-support of minor child, the first time three days after 
notification of the existance of said minor child, the second 
time, five days after Plaintiff filed this complaint, No 
evidence to the contrary has been submitted. Idaho Complaint 
for support under Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
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December 21, 198*7, and Response to Defendants' Motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, March 16, 1988 
3. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under 
certification thereof, that the minor child of the marriage 
pursuant to Title 30-2-10 of the Utah Code of Law, the Defendant 
did illegally and unlawfully take minor child out of the 
homestead thereof, that the Defendant is a drug abuser, and said 
minor child thereby is in danger. No evidence has been 
submitted to the contrary. Motion for temporary custody of minor 
child, February 16, 1988. 
4. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and under 
certification thereof, requested the whereabout of minor child 
and if minor child is safe, twice though discovery, to which 
Defendant and Counsel refused to cooperate. Response to 
Defendants* Motion to Dismiss. March 16, 1983. Plaintiffs* First 
Request for the production of Documents', March 16, 1988. 
5. That in a Court of Law, and under oath thereof, th*=* 
Defendant described that the Plaintiff was not the father of 
minor child. Petition for the termination of parental rights, 
Mav 25, 1988 
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE C 
1. Th*\t on March 16. 1988, the Plaintiff in accordance 
with Hie Pules of Civil Procedure, served upon the Defendant by 
and though her counsel, with a document of discovery, to which 
the time has past, and no attempt has been made to comply. 
Plaintiffs' First Request for the Production of Documents, March 
16, 1933. 
2. That the Trial Court two days later, dismiss said 
complaint, on "...The absence of compelling evidence..." Order-
dismissing Action, unsigned and undated, 
3. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon 
certification thereof, that the Trial Court dismissed said 
action, when the Defendant produced no evidence except the void 
decree, and the Plaintiff produced as evidence against the Idaho 
Decree seven case rulings, four Utah laws, and two affidavits 
prior to the dismissing of the case, Mo evidence to the contrary 
has been submitted, Motion for Review, March 21, 1933. 
4. That the Trial Court upheld its decision to dismiss 
this Complaint, on "...No compelling evidence..." in its 
Memorandum Decision, April 29, 1Q88. 
REVELANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE D 
t. That the Defendant was found to have disappeared 
on February 12, 1983. Mo evidence has been show otherwise. Court 
Order, February 12, 1988, 
2. That Peter W. Quvcn made a appearance twenty three 
days after the disappearance of the Defendant. Appearance of 
Defendant, March 7, 1988* 
3. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and upon 
certificate thereof, stated that Peter W. Guvon admitted to him, 
that he did not know where the De-fendant was. No evidence to the 
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contrary has been submitted. Motion for Review, March 21, 1933. 
4. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and upon 
certification thereof, stated that due to the Defendants' or 
Counsel, not cooperating in discovery, that Peter W. Guyon IS 
NOT representing the Defendant, but a foreign third party, that 
have a interest in the outcome of this case. No evidence has 
been submitted to show otherwise. Memorandum in opposition 
Defendants' Motion for protective order, April 25, 1938. 
5. That the finances of the Defendant are 1) she is 
unemployed, 2) that she is receiving $200.00 per month from 
welfare, 3) that she has two attorney of higher than normal 
prices. No evidence to the contrary has been submitted. Response 
to Motion for Rule 40 sanctions, June 20, 1988, 
6. That the Defendant by and though her Idaho Attorney, 
filed suit on 25th of May, 1988, concerning issues pending here, 
that Peter W. Guyon fights against. That said suit must have 
been filed in Idaho with complete ignorance to the proceedings 
here. No evidence has been submitted otherwise. Response to 
Motion for Rule 40 sanctions, June 20, 1988, 
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE E 
1. That Peter W. Guyon is the Plaintiffs' familys* 
attorney, and is representing them in a ongoing case, that will 
be resolved about 1994. Affidavit of Diana Kay Puie, March 1988. 
2. That only because of Peter W. Guyon client 
relationship with the PI aintiff-Appeal 1 ant family he has access 
to psychological report conducted on the Plaintiff while a minor 
child in the above divorce proceedings, and other sensitive 
reports conducted in the years, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 
1984, and 1985 on the Plaintiff, that another attorney would not 
have access to, Affidavit of Diana Kay Buie, March 1988, 
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE F 
1. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under 
certification thereof, a Memorandum of Plaintiff in opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for sanctions under Rule 11, that it is 
alleged in this that Peter W. Guyon submitted statments that 
carried a false impression to the Court, of the subject matter, 
that such statments were not only on Motions that he submitted 
but on offically Court Orders. Mo refutation or evidence to show 
otherwise has been submitted. Memorandum of Plaintiff in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for sanctions under Rule 11, 
April 13, 1988 
2, That the agrument that Peter W, Guyon incorporated 
into the purposed Court Order is the sole agrument that the 
Courts' decision to uphold its former decision that of the "Good 
Faith Clause". That Mr. Guyon is an officer of the Court, That 
no evidence to the contrary has been submitted. Memorandum 
Decision, Judge Scott Daniels, April 29, 1988, Response to 
Motion for sanctions under Rule 11, April 13, 1988. 
REVELANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE G 
1. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and under 
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certificate thereof, that in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
that each issue raised therein was be-fore the Court and was on 
the calander -for hearing, that the Motion was an attempt to 
increase litigation and served no purpose. No evidence to the 
contrary was submitted, Plaintiffs* Repsonse to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss, March 16, 1988. 
2. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon 
certificate thereof, that the Defendant filed a Motion for Order 
of contempt and entry of judgment, that each issue was before 
the Court, and the Motion was submitted to increase litigation 
and harassment. No evidence to the contrary was otherwise 
submitted. Memorandum of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Order of Contempt and for entry of judgment, April 
20, 1988. 
3. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon 
certification thereof, that Defendants' Motion and Order in 
Supplemental proceedings, contained issues that were before this 
Court, and that the Motion was submitted to increase litigation 
and far harassment * No evidence to the contrary was otherwise 
shown, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion and Order 
in supplemental proceedings, May 11, 1988. 
4« That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon 
certification thereof, that Defendants' Order in Supplemental 
proceedings, contained issues that were before this Court, and 
that the purposed Order was submitted to increase litigation and 
for harassment. No evidence to the contrary was otherwise 
shown. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants* Motion and Order 
in supplemental proceedings, May 11, 1938. 
REVELANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE H 
1. That the Motion to Dismiss and for Attornevs' Fees and 
Cost, was submitted to the Court on March 29, 1983. Motion to 
Dismiss and for Attorneys* Fees and Cost, March 29, 1983. 
2. That the Court Record contains no Notice for the 
hearing of the Motion to Dismiss and for attorney fees and cost. 
Wiedbusch v. Wiedbusch D-8^-4844 
3. That the Motion to Dismiss and for attorneys fees and 
Cost was heard and ruled upon, three days later, the 1st day of 
April, 1983. Purposed Order and Judgment, re April 1, 1983 
Unsigned and Undated. Motion for Order of Contempt and for entry 
of Judgment, April 13, 1988. 
4. That the Plaintiff objected on April 1, 1^33 to the 
Motion to Dismiss and for Attorney fees and cost, and the Court 
heard the Plaintiffs' pleas and ruled otherwise, that an Order 
to that effect was submitted and again the Plaintiff objected. 
Motion for Order of Contempt and for entrv of Judgment, April 
18, 1938. 
RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT ISSUE I 
1. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court an affidavit 
of impecunious litigant, in that he was too poor to bear the 
expenses of this action. Affidavit of impecunious litigant, 
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April 4, 1988. 
2. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, and upon 
certification thereof, that the Court awarded sanctions, against 
the Plaintiff, in the amount of $150,00 to the Defendant, for 
the sole reason that the Plaintiff was poor and could not afford 
an attorney, No evidence to the contrary was submitted. Exhibit 
"A", Plaintiffs' Rebuttal to Defendants' Objections and Motion 
for Additional Attorneys fees and cost, May 13, 1988. 
3. That the sanctions were granted in recognition of the 
litigation Plaintiff was pursuing on his own, and the 
inconvenience to counsel in responding to the same, and the 
sanction was to reward Counsel because of the Plaintiffs' 
inability to have counsel because of his poverty. No evidence 
to the contrary has been otherwise shown. Motion for Order of 
Contempt and entry of Judgment, April 18, 1988. 
4. That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court and upon 
certification thereof, that the Plaintiff upon submitting the 
above affidavit, in a letter of the same day, asked that if the 
Court upheld its' decision to award sanctions, that it allow the 
Plaintiff pay ten payments of $15.00, due to his poverty, as the 
affidavit attest to. No evidence to the contrary has been 
otherwise shown. Exhibit "A", Plaintiffs' Rebuttal to 
Defendants' Objections and Motion for additional Attorneys' fees 
and cost, Mav 13, 1988. 
5. That the Trial Court, stated Plaintiff apparently 
believes that because he is impecumiaus the Defendant should be 
made to bear the cost of his decision to proceed in PROPRIA 
PERSONA. Memorandum Decision, Honorable Scott Daniels, April 
29, 1938. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE A 
That the Defendant did not become a BONA FIDE citizen of 
Idaho and failed to acquire a domicil in Idaho, that said Decree 
was granted by fraud on the Court, that the requirement to 
become a BONA FIDE citizen of Idaho and acquire a Domicil 
therein, is stated on the face of the Idaho Decree, this being a 
resident ior the term of Six Weeks, that on fhe face of the 
Idaho Decree, it states that the Defendant left the Domicil of 
the Plaintiff, who has resided in Utah all his life, and went to 
Idaho on the 1st day of September, 1986, and that suit against 
the Plaintiff commenced only 28 days later, that of September 
29, 1986, proving that she could not have meet this Six Week 
E'equir merit and that she did not become a citizen of Idaho, and 
could not have acquired a domicil therein. That the Idaho Court 
th^ *-eof did not have the jurisdiction, and thus the Idaho Decree 
is invalid, havinq no power or effect, and Idaho action pursuant 
to this action is moot. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE A 
The Idaho Divorce Decree is not entitled to full faith and 
credit since the Plaintiff therein acquired NO Bona Fide domicil 
in Idaho, even though the decree recites that such a bona fide 
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dornicil was acquired. 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in divorce cases rests 
upon dornicil, or at residence enimo manendi, of at least one of 
the parties in the divorce forum. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent an 
inquiry in a state other than the divorce forum into the bona 
fide of this domicil or residence. 
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 239 Ala 141, 194 So 493; Wynne v. Wynne, 20 
Cal App (2d) 131, 66 P(2d) 467; Sears v. Sears, 6? App DC 379, 
92 F (2d) 530; Adams v. Adams, 191 Ga 537, 13 SE(2d) 173; Grein 
v, Grein, 303 111 App 398, 25 NE(Zd) 409; State v. Wenzel, 1S5 
La 808, 171 So 38; Usen v. Usen, J 36 Me 480, 13 A(2d) 738, 128 
ALR 1449; Nor is v. Noris, 200 Minn 246, 273 NW 708 (by 
implication); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 174 Miss 643, 165 So 414? 
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb 186, 3 NW (2d) 207, 140 ALR 
901; Sprague v. Sprague, 131 NT Eq 104, 23 A(2d) 810, Golden v. 
Golden, 41 MM 356, 68 P(2d) 28; Horowitz v. Horowitz, 58 Rl 396, 
192 A 796 (by implication); Dry v, Rice, 147 Va 331, 137 SE 473. 
See also Wilkes v. Wilkes, 245 Ala 54, 16 So(2d) 15; Hooker v. 
Hooker, 130 Conn 41, 32 A(2d) 68; Re Ainscow, --Del --, 34 A(2d) 
593J Hobson v. Dempsey Constr. Ca.9 232 Iowa 1226, 7 NW(2d) 896; 
Brown v. Hall, 385 111 260, 52 NE(2d) 781; Atkins v. Atkins, 386 
111 345, 54 NE(2d) 488; Bowditch v. Dowditch, 314 Mass 410, 50 
NE(2d) 65; Wolf v. Wolf, 134 NJ Eq 8, 34 A(2d) J50; Mascola v. 
Mascola, 134 MJ Eq 48, 33 A(2d) 864; Re Holmes, 291 NY 261, 52 
NE (2d) 424; Re Bingham, 265 App Div463, 39 NYSf2d) 756; 
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 179 Misc 623, 39 NYS(2d) 922; Smith v. 
Smith, 72 Ohio App 203, 50 NE(2d) 889? Com. ex, rel. Esenwein v. 
Esenwein, 348 Pa 455, 35 A(2d) 335. 
The state under Article 4: Section 1 of the Constitution of 
the United States is obliged to give full faith and credit to a 
foreign divorce decree in the ABSENCE OF FRAUD. 
Paris v. Hope (CCA 2d) 29B F 727; Frey v. Frey, 61 App DC 232, 
59 F(2d) 1046? Davis v. Davis, 305 US 32, 83 L ed 26, 59 S Ct 3, 
113 ALR 1518$ Loughran v, Loughran, 292 US 216, 78 L ed 1219, 54 
S Ct 684; Atherton v. Atherton, 131 US 155, 45 L ed 794, 21 S Ct 
544; Kirby v. Kirby, 143 Kan 430, 55 P(2d) 356; Voorhies v. 
Voorhies, 134 La 406, 166 So 121$ Cope v. Cope, 123 MJ Eq 190, 
196 A 422? Cardinale v, Cardinal*, 3 Cal(2d) *?62, 63 P(2d) 351? 
Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 NW 262; Com. ex rel. 
Cronhardt v. Cronhardt, 127 Pa Super Ct 501, 193 A 484; Renner 
v. Renner, 13 NJ Mis P 749, 181 A 191; 19 CJ p 370, section 336. 
When a martial partner goes to a State solely for divorce 
purposes, to obtain a decree of divorce by fraud on the court, 
they do not carry the RES with them, and the courts of the 
State to which he has gone have no jurisdiction to entertain 
their divorce suit, 
If a party goes to this jurisdiction other than that of 
their domicil, for the purpose of procurring a divorce, and has 
a residence there for that purpose onlv, such residence is not a 
bona fide, and does not confer upon the courts of that state or 
countv jurisdiction over the marriage relation, and decree they 
may assume to make would be void as to the other party. 
Bell v. Bell, 131 US 175, Coaly, Const. Lim p. 401; Hanover v. 
Turner, 14 Mass, 227, 7 Am Dec 203; Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 12 
N.H. "225? Batchelder v, Batchelder, 14 N.H. 380; Payson v. 
Payson, 34 N.H. 518; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35 N.H. 474. 
Recticals oi the decrees entered in divorce cases of one 
State are not binding on the court of another State; they may be 
contrad icted. 
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The BONA FIDES of the residence of a party who obtains a 
divorce in one State may be inquired into by the courts of 
another State. 
Bell v. Bell, 131 US 1"?5, Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 US 179, 
Andrews v. Andrews, 183 US 14? Haddock v. Haddock, 201 US 502; 
Simmons v, Simmons, 57 App DC 216} Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 US 
701; Frev v. Frey, 61 App DC 232, 
Change of citizenship, as distinguished from change of 
residence, is not always so simple a matter, and a change of 
residence does not itself necessarily involve any change of 
citizenship. Where the intent is not clear, it has to be 
inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act. 
The fact that the record of the divorce decree in Idaho 
recites the jurisdictional fact of residence can make no 
d ifference, 
Hard v, Shipman, 6 Barb. 623; Bolton v. Schriever, 
135 NY 73; Matter of Law, 56 App Div 454; Ferguson v. Crawford, 
70 NY 2735 Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall 457; Thorman v. Frame, 
176 US 350; Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. Rep. 649, 
The recitals of facts in a decree may be contradicted as to 
the facts neccessary to give the court jurisdiction; and, if it 
be shown that such facts did not exist, the record -will be a 
nullity, notwithstanding it mav recite that they did exist. 
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Fell v. Bell, 181 US 175 Thompson v. Whitman, 13 W M 1 457, 21 L 
ed 897? Knowles v. Logansports Gaslight & Coke Co. 19 Wall 61, 
22 L ed 72; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass 156, 23 Am Rep 299; 
Shannnon v. Shannon, 4 Allen, 134; Leith v. Leith, 39 N.H. 20; 
Gregory v. Gregory, 78 Me. 18*?, 57, Am Rep 792, 3 Atl. 280; 
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 NY 30, 7 Am Rep 299; Cross v. Cross, 108 
MY 628, 15 NE 333; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 MY 272; People v. DaweU, 25 
Mich 247, 22 Am Rep 260; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich 121, 50 Am Rep 
247, 17 MW 720; Chaney v. Br van, 15 Lea, 589. 
It appearing therefore, from the facts found, that neither 
Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker), nor Mrs. Wiedbusch (Baker) had a domicil 
in the Idaho, this even appearing upon the face of the Idaho 
record, the courts of Idaho had no jurisdiction to grant any 
divorce whatever, and the divorce is therefore absolutely void. 
Schouler, Husb. & Wife section 574; Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175; 
Sewall v. bewail, 122 Mass. 156, 23 Am Rep 299; People v. 
DaweU, 25 Mich. 247, 22 Am Rep 260. 
Even the presence, within its territory, of the inhabitants 
of other states, gives it no authority to grant a divorce and 
thus change their marriage status. 
Gregorv v, Gregory, 78 Me 187, 57 Am Rep 792, 3 Atl 280; Foss v. 
Foss, 58 N.H. 283? Leith v. Leith, 39 M.H. 20; Lane v. Lane, 2 
Mass. 167; Squire v. Squire, 3 Mass. 184; Choate v. Choate 3 
Mass 391? Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260; Kimball v. Kimball, 63 
N.H, 598, 4 Atl. 702; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis 658. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 325 US 226, in delivering the 
opinion of the Court makes the following statments that directly 
reflect upon this case. 
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"The implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
Article 4, Section 1, o-f the constitution, first received the 
sharp analysis o-f this Court in Thompson v. Whitman, 13 Wall 
(US) 457 ed 897. Theretofore uncritical notions about the scope 
of that Clause had been expressed in the early case of Mills v. 
Duryee, 7 Cranch (US) 4Sis 3 L ed 411. The "doctrine" of that 
case, was that ''the judgment o-f a state court should have the 
same credit, validity, and effect, in es/ery court in the United 
States, which it had in the state where it was pronouced." 
This utterance, WHEN PUT TO THE TEST, as it was in Thompson 
v. Whitman, supra, was found to be too loose. Thompson v. 
Whitman made it clear that the doctrine of Mills v. Duryee comes 
into operation only when in the language of KENT, "The 
jurisdiction of the court in another state is not impeached, 
either as to the subject matter or person." Only then is "the 
record of the judgment....entitied to full faith and credit." 1 
Kent, Commentaries, 2d ed 1832, 261 note b." 
The Court futher went on, quoting: 
"To give it the force of a judgment in another state, it 
must be made a judgment there." M'Elmoyle v, Cohen, 13 Pet (US) 
312, 10 L ed 177, 183, 
"It can be made a judgment there only if the court 
purporting to render orginal judgment had the power to render 
such j udgment." 
"Under our system of law, judical power to grant a 
divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded upon dcmicil. 
Bell v. Pell, 1S1 US 175 45 L ed 804, 2! S Ct 551? Andrews v. 
Andrews, 188 US 14, 47 L ed 366, 23 S Ct 237. The framers of 
the Constitution were familar with THIS jurisdictional 
prerequiste, and since 1789 NEITHER THIS COURT NOR AMY OTHER 
COURT IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD HAS QUESTIONED IT. Domicil 
implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as 
to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities 
of the utmost significance." 
The Court futher stated: 
"The jurisdictional requirement of domicil is freed from 
the confusing refinements about "matrimonial domicil". 
It is noteworthy that the Court did not in an/ way infringe 
upon the requirment of domicil. but in futher support thereof 
the Court stated the following: 
"The State of domiciliary orgin, should not be bound by an 
unfounded, even if not collusicve, recital in the record of a 
court of another State. As to the truth or existence of a fact, 
like that of domicil, upon which depends the power to exert 
judical authority, a State not a party to the exertion of such 
judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it 
has a right when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to 
ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial fact." 
"For domicil is the foundation of probate jurisdiction 
precisely as it is that of divorce. The ruling in Tilt v. 
Kelsey, 207 US 43, 52 L ed 95, 28 S Ct 1, regarding the probate 
of a will, is equally applicable to a sister-State divorce 
decree: "the full faith and credit due to the proceedings of the 
New Jersey court do no require that the courts of New York shall 
be bound by its adjudication on the question of domicil. ON THE 
CONTRARY, it is open to the courts of any State in the trail of 
a collateral issue to determine upon the evidence produced the 
true domicil of the deceased."... In short, the decree of 
divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything EXCEPT the 
jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is a 
jurisdictional fact." 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, futher stated: 
"In seeking a decree of divorce outside the State in which 
he has therefore maintained his marriage, a person is 
necessarily involved in the legal situation created by our 
Federal System whereby one State can grant a divorce of validity 
in other States, ONLY if the applicant has a BONA FIDE domicil 
in the other State of the Court purporting to dissolve a prior 
legal marriage." 
"However harsh and unjust North Carolina's (Utah 5 divorce 
laws may be thought to be, petitioners were bound to obey them 
while retaining residential and domiciliary ties in that state. 
NO JUSTIFIABLE purpose is served by imparting constitutional 
sanctity to the efforts of petitioners to establish a false and 
ficitious domicil in Nevada (Idaho). Such a result would only 
tend to promote wholesale disregard of North Carolina's (Utah) 
divorce laws by its citizens, thus putting an end to "the 
existence of all efficacious power on the subject of divorce." 
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 US 32, 47 L ed 369, S Ct 237. Certainly 
no policy of Nevada (Idaho) didctates lending the full faith and 
credit clause to protect actions grounded in deceit." 
It is important to note, that Idaho has specifically denied 
all their judical courts, power to grant a divorce, if the 
the application has not been there for Six (65 full weeks next 
preceeding the commencement of the action. 
Idaho Code of Law, Title 32-701, Smestad v. Smestad, 94 Idaho 
181, 484 P,2d 730 (1971); Bezold v. Bezold, 95 Idaho 131, 504 
P.2d 404 (1972); Hampshire v. Hampshire, 70 Idaho 522 P.2d 
950; Robinson v, Robinson, ^0 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031J 
Reublmann v* Reublmann, 33 Idaho 159, 220 P. 404 
In a case were the basic facts are the same basic facts as 
this case, that case was heard by the United States Supreme 
Court, the facts are the husband went to Nevada there he filed 
for suit after staying the full Nevada requirments, a North 
Carolina sheriff served personally on his wife the complaint and 
summons, the wife did not appear or answer. The Nevada decree 
stated as follows, "the plaintiff has been and now is a bona 
fide an<i continuous resident of the County of Clark, State of 
Nevada, and had been such a resident far more than six weeks 
immediately preceeding the commencement of this action in the 
manner prescribed by law", it was contended that the petitioner 
went to Nevada not to establish a residence but solely for the 
purpose of taking advantage of the laws of that State to obtain 
a divorce through fraud upon that court. The US Supreme Court 
upheld this, and Mr. Justice Douglas, stated in delivering the 
opinion of the Court, in 317 US 237, the following: 
"The intimation in the majority opinion that the Nevada 
divorces were collusive suggests that the second theory on which 
they tried the case may have been an alternative ground for the 
decision below, adequate to sustain the judgment under the rule 
of Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175, 45 L ed 804, 21 S Ct 551 a case 
in which this Court held that a decree o-f divorce was not 
entitled to full faith and credit when it had been granted on 
constructive service by the courts of a state in which neither 
spouse was domiciled." 
"Domicil of the Plaintiff, immaterial to jurisdiction in a 
personal action is recognized in the Haddock case (Haddock v. 
Haddock, 201 US 5625 and elsewhere (Beale, Conflict of Laws, 
Section 110.1) as ESSENTIAL in order to give the court 
jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to 
extraterritorial effect... " 
"Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate 
concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its 
borders. The marriage relation creates problems of large social 
importance. Protection of offspring, property interest, and the 
enforcment of marital responsibilities are but a few of 
commanding problems in the field of domestic relations with 
which the state must deal." 
In this same case, Mr. Justice Murphy, commented to the 
court as follows: 
"In recognition of the paramount interest of the state of 
domicile over the marital status of its citizens, this Court has 
held that actual good faith domicile of least one party is 
essential to confer authority and jurisdiction on the courts of 
a state to reader a decree of divorce that will be entitled to 
extraterritorial effect under the "Full faith and credit clause". 
"Both Nevada and North Carolina have rights in this regards 
rights are entitled to recognition. The conflict between those 
rights here should not be resolved by extending into North 
Carolina the effects of Nevada's action through a perfunctory 
application of the literal language of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause with the result that measures which North Carolina has 
adopted to safeguard the welfare of her citizens in this area of 
legitimate governmental concern are undermined." 
Mr. Justice Jackson, in this same case commented to the 
court as follows: 
"I cannot join in exerting the judical power of the Federal 
Goverment to compel the State of North Carolina to subordinate 
its own law to the Nevada divorce decrees...It subjects 
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matrimonial laws of each state to important limitations and 
exceptions that it must be recognize within its own borders and 
easier system of divorce, in which neither party has ever lived, 
and there commence proceedings without personal service of 
process. The spouse remaining within the state of domicile need 
never know of the proceedings. Or, if it comes to one's 
knowlege, the choice is between equa!3y useless alternatives: 
one is to ignore the foreign proceedings, in which case the 
marriage is quite certain to be dissolved; the other is to 
follow the complaining spouse to the state of his choice and 
there defend under the laws which grant the dissolution on 
relatively trivial grounds. To declare that a state is 
powerless to protect either its own policy or the family rights 
of its people against such consequences has serious 
const i tut ional imp 1icat ions." 
"...Divorce judgments asking for our enforcement under the 
full faith and credit clause, unlike judgments arising out of, 
commercial transactions and the like, MUST also foe supported by 
good-faith domicile of one of the parties within the judgment 
state. Such is certainly a reasonable requirement. A state can 
have no legitimate concern with the matrimonial status of two 
persons, neither of whom lives within its territory." 
CONCLUSION ON ISSUE A 
1. That Utah can legal impeach the Idaho decree on the 
lack of jurisdiction, without violating the "Full Faith and 
Credit Clause" of the Constitution. 
US SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT section 360 - of sister state -
full faith and credit. 
"The full faith and credit clause operates only with 
respect to judgments rendered by a court whose jurisdiction, 
either as to the subject matter or person, is not impeached." 
2. That the Idaho decree does not have any effect on the 
Utah Court, until it has been made a judgment in Utah. 
US SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, Section 356 - of sister state -
conelusiveness, 
"The full faith and credit clause does not make a 
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sister-state judgment a judqment in anotner state, but to give 
it that effect, it must be made a judgment there, which can be 
done only if the court purporting to render the original 
judgment had power to pass on the merits." 
3. That this power to p?ss on the merits, is based upon 
domicil of one of the parties. 
US SUPREME COURT DIVORCE, Section 4 - jurisdiction to 
grant - domicil as basis. 
"Judical power to grant a divorce is founded on domicil," 
A. That the State of Idaho has spefically denied all their 
courts, the power to grant a divorce if the applicant has done 
acquired a domicil in Idaho and resided in this domicil Six (6) 
full weei'S prior to the commencement of the divorce action. 
IDAHO CODE OF LAW, Title 32-701 - residence required by the 
plaintiff. 
''A divorce must not be granted unless the plaintiff has 
been a resident of the state for Six (6) full weeks next 
precedinq the commencement of the action," 
E. That the Plaintiff by a undisputed affidavit proved 
that he was a resident of Utah all his life, that if Mrs, 
Wiedbusch left him on September 1, 1986, which fact was proven 
true bv the Idaho Co«»rt, she could not have resided in Idaho for 
Six (6) full weeks prior to the commencement of the Idaho action. 
4. That domicil is a residence of permanence, in which 
legal relationships can and or made. 
US SUPREME COURT DIVORCE, Section 1 - permanence of 
residence as essential. 
"Domicil implies a nexus between person a,nd place of such 
permanence as to control the creation of legal relationships and 
responsibilities of the utmost significance." 
A. That the Plaintiff, by a undisputed affidavit, proved 
that Mrs. Wiedbusch was in Oregan until September 13, 1^36, at 
which time she went to Parma, Idaho and disappeared that day, 
that on "September 14, 1986 the Defendant, Mrs. Wiedbusch was 
offically listed in the state of Idaho as a "Missing Person". 
That with all this evidence as this Court has, and the 
requirements that the US Supreme Court has set down for all 
Courts to follow, there is no way that the Defendant could have 
any domicil in Idaho prior to the commencement of the Idaho 
action, that a "Missing Person" could not be construed to be 
able to create ar\y legal relations between herself and Idaho of 
any signifance, and for her testimony to show that she could not 
have meet that jurisdictional fact, the Idaho Decree can not be 
thought of as anything but fraud upon the court. That Idaho 
legislature has specifically denied all their courts power, if 
the jurisdictional fact does not exist. Therefore the Idaho 
Decree is null and void, there was no domicil in Idaho by either 
party. The Idaho Court was by law ordered not to issue this 
decree. They had no judical power by law. Most importantly the 
Idaho Court did not have the power to pass on the merits. 
In the interest of protecting the citizens of Utah from 
unlawfully prosecution, ^nd upholding the outlines of the 
Supreme Court of this Land, this Decree must be impeached. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE B 
That the Memorandum Decision does not uphold the 
PI aint if -f s* rights and protection under the Constitution of 
Utah. That a Decree of Divorce is a proceeding that involves 
the rights o-f each party and the issue of the marriage, that 
this, by law and upheld by the US SUPREME COURT, to protect each 
citizen, is governored and regulated by each sovereign State, to 
protect and uphold the responsibilities of each party in a 
martial relation, That this State can not either directly or 
indirectly be deprived of its sovereignity to regulate the 
status of its domiciled citizens. That the Defendant fled this 
State to escape the hard divorce laws that was set down, to 
protect our citizens from the vpry effect that has occured to 
the Plaintiff. That the Defendant left the marriage for a cause 
that occured within this st^te, fled to Idaho, where she did not 
meet the residence requirment, and illegally obtained a Decree, 
unlawful 1 filing in Idaho, and used it to harass the Plaintiff. 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE B 
That it is the right of ev&ry person to be secure and 
protected from fear, intimidation, harassment, and harm caused 
by the activities of groups and individuals. 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy 
and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and 
protect property..." The Constitution of Utah Artice l; Section 1 
That the States have the dutv to protect their citizens, 
from the citizens who go to another forum in another State to 
obtain a divorce. That Utah was deprived of its soverign 
rights, to protect its citizens, the Plaintiff and minor child, 
and uphold their rights as to the marriage, and uphold both 
parties rights, and impose sanctions and restriction upon both 
parties, which in fact were Utah citizens. 
That the US Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Gray, m 131 US 166, 
Atherton v. Atherton, states as follows: 
"It is obvious that marriage, as a domestic relation, 
emerged from the contract which created it, is known and 
recognized as such throughout the civilized world; that it gives 
rights and imposes duties and restrictions upon the parties to 
it, affecting their social and moral condition, of the measure 
of which every civilized State, and certainly every State of 
this Union, is the sole judge so far as to its own citizens or 
subjects are concerned, and should be so deemed by other 
civilized, and especially sister States; that a State cannot be 
deprived, directly or indirectly, of its sovereign power to 
regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects and citizens, 
by the fact that the subjects and citizens of other States, as 
related to them, are interested in that status, and in such 
matter has a right, under the general law..." 
In support to safeguard the rights of each States citizens 
and the rights and power of sovernity that each State has, Mr. 
Justice Grav, futher stated in the opinion of the Court, the 
Court upheld and advanged the statute of Massachusetts, as 
follows; 
"When an inhabitant of this State goes into another State 
or country to obtain a divorce for any cause occuring here, and 
whilst the parties resided here, or for any cause which would 
not authorize a divorce by the laws of this State, a divorce so 
obtained shall have no force or effect in this State." 
Pursuant to this case, because the Defendant, Mrs. 
Wiedbusch (Baker), unlawfully filed in a foreign forum, the 
rights of the Plaintiff, Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker) as to the 
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discovery of the minor child, was not upheldu Visitation of 
said minor child was not so ordered, because the Complaint that 
was served upon Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker) expressly stated, "That 
there have been no children born of this marriage." That the 
Defendant, by fraud upon the Court tried to hide the existance 
of the unborn minor child. That the Defendant is a known drug 
addict, in that area, that said minor child, was given no 
protection from the effects of the Defendants' uncontrolled drug 
usage durning pregnancy. 
That the Plaintiff was never notified of the existance of 
said minor child, by the Defendant or the foreign Court, that 
eight months after the Default Hearing, the State of Idaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare, sent a letter, asking why he 
was four months behind on his child support. 
That on July 19, 1987, three days after receiving the Idaho 
letter, the State of Idaho and the Defendant, Mrs, Wiedbusch 
(Baker) filed suit against the Plaintiff for the non-payment of 
child support. Asking for Utah to seize the Plaintiffs' assets, 
and to garnish his wages. The Plaintiff had not received any 
Orders to pav child support, or notice that a child existed. 
On December 21, 1987, the State of Idaho and the Defendant, 
Mrs. Wiedbusch (Baker), again filed suit against the Plaintiff, 
Mr. Wiedbusch (Staker) for the willfull non-payment of child 
support, and sent said Order to Utah for enforcement, that said 
offense is a Third Degree Felony. 
That Idaho based all action, upon the fraudulent Idaho 
Decree, and has not submitted any evidence to the validity of 
their claim against the Plaintiff. 
That the Defendant, Mrs, Wiedbusch, has now submitted to 
the Idaho Court, that she was guilty of adulery, that she had 
broken the marital vows, to such a degree that she did not know 
who the Father was of the minor child, but it was not the 
Plaintiff. Petition for the termination of the Parental Rights 
of R. Troy Wiedbusch (Staker), May 25, 1983. 
That the Plaintiff has been dragged though one and half 
years of mental duress, not knowing if a minor child existed, 
not knowing where the minor child is, knowing that the Defendant 
is a known drug addict, and could be living in drug flophouse, 
as she has in the past, that she could be selling the minor 
child sexually, in an attempt to acquire drugs, that she could 
be ir> jail, and minor child is in a foster home. 
That all of this is a direct result of the Defendant, 
abandoning the homestead, in Utah, and attempting to escape 
Utahs' tough divorce laws, and running to a friendly foreign 
forum, and securing a divorce by fraud on the court as to 
residence and domicil. 
That it is the right of every person to be secure and 
protected from fear, intimidation, harassment, and harm caused 
by the activities of groups and individuals, 
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CONCLUSION ON ISSUE B 
1, That a citizen of one State can not go into a 
sister-State and there obtain a decree of Divorce for a cause 
arising out of the first State. 
US SUPREME COURT 181 US 1^ 6 
"When a inhabitant of this State goes into another State or 
Country to obtain a divorce for any cause occuring here, and 
whilst the parties resided here, or for any cause which would 
not authorize a divorce by the laws of this State, a divorce so 
obtained shall have no force or effect in the State." 
2, That the rights of the remaining spouse can not be 
upheld by the granting of "Good-Faith" to the Decree of Divorce 
obtain by the other by fraud on the Court, 
US SUPREME COURT 317 US 237 
" , ,,It nullifies the power of each state to protect its own 
citizens against the dissolution of their marriage by the courts 
oi other states which have an easier system of divorce, in which 
neither party has ever lived, and there commence proceedings 
without personal service of process. The spouse remaining 
within the state of domicile need n^y^r know of the proceedings. 
Or, if it copies to ones' knowledge, the choice is between 
equal 1y useless alternatives." 
3. It is the right of each and e^ery citizen to feel 
secure and protected. Constitution of Utah. 
4. That b' the upholding of a foreign T&cree which was 
obtained bv fraud on the Court, and to escape the hard divorce 
laws of this State, is not upholding the rights of the citizens 
who did not flea to a foreign State to acquire a Decree. 
Therefore to uphold the Plaintiffs* rights this Idaho 
Decree of Divorce must be impeached. 
SUMMARY ON ISSUE C 
That the dismissal of the case, with the issue of the 
validity of the Idaho 'Decree in the pleadings of the case, and 
then to based this dismissal on the Idaho Decree and no 
compelling evidence, does not allow ior a proper redress oi 
grievances. That is the very reason that Discovery as outlined 
in the Utah Court Rules, as set down by Law, in Utah Title 73, 
annotated 1953, as admended, this exist to allow each party 
a wa* to obtain evidence to show that the pleadings in the case 
Rre either true and the action requested thereby Ordered, or to 
show that the pleadings in the case are false at^d the action 
requested der^ led. 
That the Defendant by and though her counsel of record, 
acknowledge the validity of the Discovery document, entitled 
"PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS", 
March 16, 1«38, in their "MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER", April 
21, 19S8. That the Trail Court does not have the right to 
dismiss a case, in the middle of discovery, on the bases of the 
'''Good-Faith" of a document that the pleadings of the complaint 
specificall/ states was acquired by fraud, and one of the 
Plaintiffs' redress by said complaint is to show the fraud of 
said document, and impeachment of the document. 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT ON ISSUE C 
That ar) March 16, 1938, the Plaintiffin accordance with the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, served upon the Defendant by and though 
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her counsel, with a document of discovery, to which <.ne allowed 
thirty days has past, and no attempt by Defendant or Counsel has 
been made to comply. 
That the Trial Court two days later, dismiss said 
complaint, on "...The absence of compelling evidence.. . ". 
That the Plaintiff then submitted his Motion for Review, in 
which he points out that the Trial Court dismissed said action, 
when the Defendant produced no evidence except the void decree, 
and the Plaintiff produced as evidence against the Idaho Decree 
seven case rulings, four Utah laws, and two affidavits prior to 
the dismissing of the case. 
The Trail Court upheld its decision to dismiss this 
Complaint, on "...Mo compelling evidence..." in its memorandum 
decision, in contrary to what the US Supreme Court ruled: 
"The only evidence upon this point was in an affidavit... 
The evidence is meagre and not entirely satisfactory and 
conclusive, IT WAS'HOWEVER, UNCONTRADICTED." Tilt v. Kelsey, 
20? US 53, 
That to base the dismissal upon the Idaho Decree, is 
contrary to what the US Supreme Court ruled: 
"Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into 
another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its 
territory and respond to proceedings against them. Publication 
of process or notice within the State where the tribunal sits 
cannot create any greater obligation upon the non-resident to 
appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and process 
published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to 
establish his personal lability." Haddock v. Haddock 201 US 562. 
"It is enough to say (of this proceeding) that it was 
wholly without jurisdiction of the person, and whatever validity 
it may have in England, (Idaho) by virtue of statute law against 
property of the defendant there situate, it can have no validity 
here, even of a PRIMA FACIE character. It is simply null," 
Bishoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall 812. 
The Plaintiff had in a preivous brief submitted to the 
Trial Court the US Supreme Court ruling of Williams vs. North 
Carolina, 325 US 226, where the US Supreme Court made the 
foil owi ng j udgmen t; 
"Thp -full faith and credit clause does not make a 
sister-state judgment a judgment in another state, but to give 
it that effect, it must be made a judgment there, which can be 
done onl^' if the court purporting to render the orginal judgment 
had power to pas on the merits," 
The Trial Court in its Memorandum decision dismissed said 
case because, the Honorable Scott Daniels felt that a another 
Court could not determine if the jurisdictional -fact hB,d been 
met. The Trial Court then backed his decision with Williams v. 
North Carolina, 325 US 226, but said US Supreme Court stated the 
following in this case, under Judgment 370 Section 370 - Divorce 
- Refusal to accord full faith and credit: 
"A judgment refusing to accord full faith and credit to the 
divorce decree of a sister state on the ground that no bona fide 
domicil was acquired there will not be upset by the United 
States Supreme Court if this court finds that proper weight was 
gi /en to the claims of power by the court of the sister state? 
that the burden of disproving the domicil there was proper 1/ 
charged against the party challenging the validity of the 
divorce decree; that such issue of fact was left for fair 
determination by appropriate procedure; and that a finding as to 
absence of domicil in the sister state is amply supported in 
evidence. . . *' 
That the evidence might not have been amply, but it however 
was uncontested. 
Th^t -fraud as to domicile and residence voids and/or 
nullifies decree. 
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Watson v. Watson, 270 S.E.2d 257; 49 N.C. App 58; In re 
Carters' Estate, 331 N.Y.S.2d 257, 69 Misc. 2d 630; Cole v. 
Cole, Const, art, 4:1, cl 1, 23 U.S.C.A.: 1738 Id.J Day v. Day 
205 A.2d 798; Winters v. Winters, Ar J'Stats: : 34-1208, 34-1208-1, 
111 So.2d 418; Weiier • . Weiier, 331 S.W.2d 165; Aspromonte v. 
Aspromonte, 164 N.V.S.2d 29^; Alabama Comment, Code Ala.1940, 
Tit.34:;27,29, U.S.C.Ac Const, art 4:1, --Id.J Donne!1 v. 
Howell, Code Ala.1*40, Tit.34::27,29, U.S.C.A. Const, art 
4:liC.J.S. Divorce 169c; Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, 
ref. n. r. e, ; Muroma v. Muiwna, 194 P. 2d 24, 36 C.A.2d 133; 
Galloway v. Galloway, 2 P.2d 842, 116 C.A. 133. 
That if it can be shown that the Defendant did not 
live there Six Weeks prior which the Decree shows, that the 
Decree should have been impeached. 
In re James' Estate, 33 P. 1122, 99 C. 374. 3"? Am.St.R. 60; 
Hammond v, Hammond, I.C.:32-701:RCW 26.08.21, 45 Wash.2d 855; 
Delanoy v. Delanoy, 13 P.2d 719, 216 C. 27, 86 A.L.R. 1321; In 
re Pauls* Estate, 1~>5 P.2d 284, *?7 C,A,2d 5"?9} Rehearing denied, 
102 P.2d 545, 38 C.A.2d 579; Concurrinq - Id; Stewart v. 
Stewart, 89 P,2d 404, 32 C.A.2d 148 5 Kegle/ v. Kegle/, 60 P,2d 
404, 32 C.A.2d 216; R/der v. Ryder, 3"? P.2d 482, 16 C.A.2d 426; 
Wampler v. Wampler, U.S.C.A. Const. 4:1, 170 P,2d 316, 25 
Wash.2d 258? Ex parte Medbury, 73 P.2d 1340, 192 Wash. 462. 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE C 
1. That the Trial Court was out o-f line, in dismiss said 
complaint on the Idaho Decree of Divorce and denying Discovery, 
that said Decree of Divorce was not made a judgment here, and 
the Court had evidence to suggest that said Decree was acquired 
by fraud on the Court and said Idaho Court did not have the 
jurisdiction needed to render a valid decreet and was wrong in 
dismissing said complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE D 
That Peter W. Guyon is in fact representing a unknown third 
party. That Peter W, Guyon, confessed that he did not know 
where the Defendant really was, stating that he thinks, she is 
somewhere in Idaho, 
That the Trial Court on February 12, 1988 found that the 
Defendant had indeed ran away, and disappeared, in which she did 
not leave a forwarding address. That this Order has not been 
put aside, that the Defendant has not made any appearance, the 
Defendant has not answered anv of the allegation that was before 
the Trial Court, that said day for the submitting of the answers 
was the 12th day of March, 1988, and yet she has not answered 
them to date, the Defendant has not refuted any of the 
allegations made against her, the Defendant has not submitted 
any affidavit whatsoever, the Defendant has not participated in 
Discovery, nor has made any attempt to justify not participating. 
That the Plaintiff has alleged that Peter W. Guyon was 
representing a unknown third party in his MOTION FOR REVIEW, and 
brief, on April 1, 1988, that Peter W. Guyon has not since that 
time been able to acquire any proof whatsoever that he is the 
Defendants' at tornev. 
That Peter W. Guyon has had plenty of time, and has not in 
anyway refuted the truthfu11ness of him representing a third 
party, 
DETAILS ON ARGUMENT ON ISSUE D 
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That the Defendant was fond to have disappeared on February 
12, 1988, by the Trial Court, 
That Peter W. Guyon made a appearance twenty three days 
after the disappearance of the Defendant. 
On March 18, 1988 after the Court Hearing, that Peter W. 
Guyon told the undersign that he did not really know where the 
defendant was, 
That it has been allged by the Plaintiff that Mr. Guyon is 
representing a third party, since April 1, 1988 in which Mr, 
Guvon has not been able to subrnitt anv evidence from his client 
to show otherwise, 
That the Defendant is unemployed and receives $200,00 per 
month from welfare, that if Mr, Guyon is her attorney, has two 
attorneys who fight each other. 
That oti May 25, 1988, the Defendant filed suit on issues 
pending here, in complete ignorance to the proceedings here, 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE D 
1. Based on the evidence that is before this Court, Peter 
W. Guyon is in fact representing a unknown third party. 
2. That in pursuant to the undisputed Court Order, the 
Defendant did in fact disappear, Bn6 has not made a appearance, 
3. That Peter W. Guyon is representing a third party, and 
himself in a personal fight with the Plaintiff, who was a 
hostile witness in the divorce proceedings of his family. 
4. That the Defendant was a known drug addict, and was 
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trafficing drugs into Salt Lake City, Utah for Dr. Waldon E, 
Isom, of Ontario Oregan, and that the Defendant used the 
marriage as a front for said operations, and fled when this 
operation was discovered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE E 
That Peter W. Guyon could not have represented the Defendant 
for he was the Plaintiffs' family attorney, in which he was 
representing the Plaintiffs' step-father. That as the familys' 
counsel, it was a violation of his attorney-client relationship. 
That Peter W. Guyon be disiplined for not recusing himself, when 
he was served the MOTION TO DISMISS PETEP W. GUYON, on March ?, 
198S the day he made a appearance. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE E 
That Peter W. Guyon is the Plaintiffs' family attorney and 
as such has access to sentitive personal reports on the 
Plaintiff, that another attorney would not have. And that his 
representing the Defendant is a direct conflict of interest. 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE E 
1. That Peter W. Guyon is currently the counsel of record 
in a legal conflict that started when the Plaintiff was a minor 
child, and will be resolved in 1994. 
2. That as such he has a personal knowledge of the 
Plaintiff and has access to psychological report and other 
sentitive information that was acquired on the Plaintiff as a 
mi nor child. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE F 
That a fair hearing could not have been given to the 
Plaintiff, by the Defendants' counsel, Peter W. Guyon, 
misrepresenting things to the Trial Court, on offical purposed 
Court Orders. That said misrepresentations stayed with the 
Trial Court, and that the Plaintiff did not obtain a fair 
hearing with the Defendants' counsel perjuring to the Court. 
That Peter W. Guyon be displined for making misrepresentations 
to the Trial Court. 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE F 
That the Plaintiff submitted to the Court, a MEMORANDUM OF 
PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
UNDER RULE 11, that in this document, the Plaintiff points out 
14 such misrepresentsions, impling a false impression to the 
Trial Court, on such things as Motions, Orders. 
That one of such misrepresentations the adding of the 
"Good-Faith Clause" to a purposed Order was the sole argument 
that the Trial Court uphelds its decision to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE F 
1. That this is not a trivial matter, this is called 
perjury, and because of Peter W. Guyon doing this, it cost the 
Plaintiff a fair hearing. 
2. That Mr. Guyon has been aware of this, and has not 
refuted the truthfu11ness to date or has stopped it, but still 
seeks to confuse the issues. 
SUMMARY OH ISSUE G 
That the Trial Court did not accurately uphold existing 
Utah Law, when it without making the necessary findings, denied 
four counts of Rule 11 sanctions, against the Defendant,, when 
her counsel Peter W, Guyon submitted Motions in which each issue 
was already before the Trial Court, and set for Hearing. That 
the Plaintiff should be award sanction equal to the sanction 
that was awarded to Peter W. Guyon, that of $150.00 for each 
of the four times, 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE G 
That Peter W. Guyon, in the behalf of the Defendant 
submitted a Motion to Dissmiss, on which every issue was before 
the Trial Court, and set for hearing. That he has futher filed a 
Motion for Order of contempt and entry oi judgment, on which 
every issue was before the Court. And he futher submitted a 
Motion *nd Order in Supplemental proceedings, on which every 
issue was already before the Court, And he submitted a Order in 
Supplemental proceedings, ordering the Plaintiff into Court 
which was served on him the day before the set hearing, and 
evsry issue was already before e the Court, 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE G 
1. That in each case the Trail Court refused to grant 
Rule 11 sanction, even thou the Motions and Order served no 
purpose and was solel/ for harassment, that this was pointed out, 
and no evidence was submitted to show otherwise^ that on the last 
Motion and Order, they defaulted and didn't even show up, 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE H 
That the Trial Court on April 1, 1988 awarded sanction 
against the Plaintiff when it so Ordered the Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss and far Attorneys' fees and cost, March 29, 1988. 
That said Motion was mailed to the Plaintiff on said day, and 
pursuant to Rule 5(e) was legally served upon the Plaintiff on 
the very day of the 1st day of April, 1988 but after the hearing. 
That a partv can not submitt a Motion to the Court and have 
the Court award said Motion, before the opposing party, in this 
case the Plaintiff has not legally received it. That this is 
not in accordance with the Rule of Civil Procedure, as contained 
in the Utah Court Rule, 1953 annotated, as amended. That the 
Trial Court was out of line in awarding said sanction. That 
said sanction was based in the Memorandum Decision, April 29, 
1988 Honorable Scott Daniels on the lack of familarity of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that this is a vaque argument, that 
can neither be proven or disproven, that the Trial Court did not 
back said argument up with any facts or findings, that it was a 
punishment for being poor and not being able to afford ari 
attor ney, 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE H 
That the Motion to Dismiss and for Attorneys' fees and 
Cost, was submitted to the Court on March 29, 1998. That no 
notice was submitted to hear said Motion. That Mr. Guyon 
illegally and against Rule 5(e) Rules of Civil Procedure brought 
said Motion up three days later. that the Court overruled the 
Plaintiffs* pleas and Ordered the same against him. 
That in the Motion for Order of Contempt and *or entry of 
Judgment, April IS, 1988, Mr. Guyon shows the real reason why 
the Trial Court granted sanctions, which was because the 
Plaintiff was representing himself PRO SE and was to poor to 
have ^fi attorney. 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE H 
1. That the Motion to dismiss and for Attorneys' fees and 
cost was illegally brough before the Trial Court, and the Trial 
Court was in error to grant said sanctions. 
2. "*hat the sanctions were r>ot awarded irs pursuant to 
Rule li5 but was a punishment against the Plaintiff for being 
desti K»ed . 
SUMMARY ON ARGUMENT ON ISSUE I 
That the Trial Court did in fact slander the interity of 
the Plaintiff, when he move the court for payments of 515.00 
each due to his destitution. And the Trial Court put into its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, that the Plaintiff in asking for payments 
BELIEVES that because he is poor, that the Defendant should.be 
made to bear the cost of his decision to proceed PROPRIA 
PERSONA. That this is not the case and this MEMORANDUM DECISION 
should be put aside, 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE I 
That the Trial Court awarded sanctions against the 
Plaintiff, because he did not have a attorney and was detitued. 
That the Plaintiff in an effort to uphold his obligations asked 
for payments, to which the Court in its Memorandum Decision 
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stated that the Plaintiff feels that the Defendant should pay 
hi s way. 
CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENT ON ISSUE I 
1. That the Trial Court did in fact slander the Plaintiff 
actionable psr se. 
2. That the Trail Court did not give the Plaintiff a fair-
hear i ng. 
3. That the Trial Court did not uphold the Plaintiffs' 
rights to Equal Protection and Treatment under the law. 
CONCLUSION 
That the Plaintiff did not receive a fair Hearing in 
accordance with the existing laws of the State of Utah, That 
the Plaintiffs' rights as to Equal Protection and Treatment was 
also denied, That the 30 days for the answering of the 
Complaint has passed, and no answer has been issued, and must be 
construed as Default. That the Defendant has not cooperated in 
Discovery, and Peter W, Guvon is at a loss as to how to obtain 
any information from the Defendant. That the evidence presented 
to this Court by the Plaintiffs' affidavits is meagre and not 
entirely satisfactory, but IT WAS HOWEVER, UNCONTRADICTED. That 
the time to present evidence is over, and in the interest of 
Justice the Plaintiff prays as follows: 
1) That the Memorandum Decision and other unsigned Orders 
of March 13, 1988 and April 1, 1^83 be reversed, 2) that the 
Complaint for Divorce be not dismissed, 3) that the Idaho Decree 
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be found lacking the jurisdictional fact and be impeached, 4) 
that a determination be made if Peter W, Guyon is or is not the 
counsel of Defendant, 5) that if Peter W. Guyon is not the 
Defendants' counsel that all papers' submitted by him be 
striken, 6) that if Peter W. Guyon is the Defendants' counsel 
that he be removed, and disiplined for conflict of interest, 7) 
that Peter W. Guyon be recommended for suspension for making 
misrepresentations to the Trial Court, 8) that four counts oi 
sanctions be awarded to the Plaintiff for Defendants' or Peter 
W. Guyons* violations of Rule 11 in the amount of $150,00 per 
violation, 9) that the judgment of $150.00 awarded as a 
punishment against the Plaintiff be reversed, 10) that the 
legality of this matter be brought to the Trial Court, 11) that 
the Plaintiff receives damages in the amount of $3,00 per page 
of this brief, $125.00 filing fee, $25.00 transfer fee, and 
whatever the Court feels should be awarded. 
DATED this the t> day of August, 1988. 
^ ^ ^ f c ^ ^ f T l -
R. Tr^rHaJkaker, 
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e a l l a n t * 
* 
R. Troy Staker 
208 South Main tt 38 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 562-2568 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF THE BRIEF OF APPEALLANT 
August 5, 1988. 
I, R. Troy Staker, hereby certifies that on the date of August 
5, 1988, I did go to the office of Peter W. Guyon, located at 
614 Newhouse, 10 Exchange Place, in Salt Lake City, Utah and did 
deliver to him, or a person authorized to accept delivery of 
this service, four true and correct copies of the offical Brief 
of Appeallant, that is filed on this date, in the Court of 
Appeals. 
DATED this the 5th day of August, 1988. 
^--/sio^J^i^Lc^ 
R. Troy Staker 
I, Peter W. Guyon, or a person authorized to accept service in 
ard for the behalf of him do hereby certify that I received the 
above stated document. 
DATED this the 5th day of August, 1988. 
